The Solana Security Standard —
SOL-0XXrules distilled from $514M of real exploits, firing as you code in every AI tool (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf…), your editor, and CI. By the auditors who find them.

The same SOL-0XX rules flag Solana-specific bugs while you code — caller-controlled clock values, cross-market state asymmetry, wrapper handlers that drift from engine logic, missing Anchor constraints, and 37 bug classes in all, drawn from real audits.
Works in: Claude Code · Codex · Copilot · Cursor · Windsurf · Cline · Aider · any MCP client · the VS Code extension (Open VSX) · the CLI · Semgrep · GitHub Actions. Pick your surface below.
Use it in Claude Code (30 seconds)
mkdir -p .claude && \
curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Copenhagen0x/solana-security-standard/main/plugin-guidance.md \
-o .claude/claude-security-guidance.md && \
curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Copenhagen0x/solana-security-standard/main/security-patterns.yaml \
-o .claude/security-patterns.yaml
plugin-guidance.md is the compact ≤8 KB plugin digest (every rule as a one-line cue, generated from the full claude-security-guidance.md); it lands as the plugin's .claude/claude-security-guidance.md. Full per-rule detail is one MCP call (list_solana_security_rules) or one click (the master on GitHub) away.
Then make sure you have Anthropic's security-guidance plugin installed:
/plugin install security-guidance@claude-plugins-official
/reload-plugins
Done. Open a Solana program file in Claude Code and the plugin will catch issues as you write.
(This pulls from main with no integrity check. For supply-chain-sensitive use, see Verified install below.)
Or install the whole standard as a Claude Code plugin (the MCP scan tool + a /scan command, auto-wired):
/plugin marketplace add Copenhagen0x/solana-security-standard
/plugin install solana-security-standard@solana-security-standard
Verified install (pin + checksum)
For CI or supply-chain-sensitive setups, pin to a release tag and verify the download against the published CHECKSUMS.txt instead of pulling main:
Note: the
plugin-guidance.mddigest ships from v1.11.0 onward. Until that release is tagged, use the Quick install above (which pulls the digest frommain); the pinned-tag flow below works once v1.11.0 exists.
TAG=v1.11.0 # the digest ships from v1.11.0 on; older tags use claude-security-guidance.md directly
BASE="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Copenhagen0x/solana-security-standard/$TAG"
tmp=$(mktemp -d) && cd "$tmp" && mkdir -p semgrep
curl -fsSL "$BASE/CHECKSUMS.txt" -o CHECKSUMS.txt
curl -fsSL "$BASE/plugin-guidance.md" -o plugin-guidance.md
curl -fsSL "$BASE/security-patterns.yaml" -o security-patterns.yaml
curl -fsSL "$BASE/semgrep/solana-security-standard.yaml" -o semgrep/solana-security-standard.yaml
sha256sum -c CHECKSUMS.txt # Linux — all three must print "OK"; aborts on any mismatch
# macOS (no sha256sum): shasum -a 256 -c CHECKSUMS.txt
mkdir -p "$OLDPWD/.claude"
cp security-patterns.yaml "$OLDPWD/.claude/"
cp plugin-guidance.md "$OLDPWD/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md" # rename to the plugin's expected filename
# the verified semgrep ruleset stays in $tmp/semgrep/ — point `semgrep --config` at it or copy where you need it
Pinning to a tag freezes you to a known release (a tampered main can't reach you); the checksum confirms nothing was altered in transit. (Hashes are over the LF bytes GitHub serves — verify the downloaded files, not a CRLF local checkout.) Tags from v1.9.1 on are SSH-signed — verify origin with git verify-tag v1.11.0 (key + steps in SECURITY.md). (Checksums and the in-repo allowed-signers can't defend against a full account compromise that rewrites both — the signed tag, verified out of band, is the origin check for that.)
Run it in CI — GitHub Action
Gate every pull request on the standard. The same SOL-0XX patterns run as a check, with inline annotations on the diff:
# .github/workflows/solana-security.yml
name: Solana Security Standard
on: [pull_request]
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write # optional — enables inline PR annotations
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Copenhagen0x/solana-security-standard@v1
with:
paths: ./programs # what to scan (default: .)
# fail-on-findings: true # red X on findings (default)
# upload-sarif: true # GitHub code scanning (default)
# min-tier: high # noise floor: drop LOW-tier hygiene findings
# baseline: .sss-baseline.json # gate only on NEW findings (see cli/README)
Then show the world you adopt it — drop this badge in your README:
Run it from the CLI
npx @jelleo/solana-security-standard scan ./programs
Human, JSON, or SARIF output; exits non-zero on findings (so it gates any CI). Zero dependencies. Details in cli/.
Every machine rule is scored against its canonical vulnerable/fixed example pair on every change — see BENCHMARK.md (generated, CI-enforced: a rule that stops detecting its bug, or starts flagging its fix, cannot merge).
Run it in your editor — VS Code / Cursor / Windsurf
The VS Code extension shows SOL-0XX findings as inline warning squiggles as you
type, in Rust and TypeScript/JS files. Same engine as the CLI, 100% local (no telemetry). Install it
from Open VSX — works in Cursor,
Windsurf, and VSCodium; on stock VS Code, sideload the .vsix from extensions/vscode/
(the Microsoft Marketplace listing is pending publisher verification). Details in extensions/vscode/.
Run it with Semgrep
Already have a Semgrep pipeline? Point it at the ported ruleset:
semgrep --config https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Copenhagen0x/solana-security-standard/main/semgrep/solana-security-standard.yaml ./programs
The same SOL-0XX rules as pattern-regex rules. Details in semgrep/.
Use it in your AI coding agent — Codex · Copilot · Cursor · Windsurf · Cline · Aider
Most AI coding tools read a rules/instructions file. integrations/ ships the SOL-0XX
standard in each tool's native format — all generated from the one source — so your assistant writes
and reviews Solana/Anchor code against the rules. Copy the file for your tool (full matrix in
integrations/README.md):
| Tool | Copy into your repo |
|---|---|
Codex / any AGENTS.md agent |
integrations/codex/AGENTS.md |
| GitHub Copilot | integrations/copilot/.github/copilot-instructions.md |
| Cursor | integrations/cursor/.cursor/ |
| Windsurf | integrations/windsurf/.windsurf/ |
| Cline | integrations/cline/.clinerules |
| Aider | integrations/aider/ (with an optional scanner lint command) |
Use it via MCP — any MCP client
Prefer the Model Context Protocol? The MCP server gives any MCP client (Cline, Copilot,
Cursor, Claude, Windsurf) a scan_solana_code tool plus the full rule set — no file to copy:
{ "mcpServers": { "solana-security-standard": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@jelleo/solana-security-mcp"] } } }
100% local, same scanner as the CLI. Details in mcp/.
Learn from real exploits — the Solana Hacks Database
hacks/ maps real, disclosed Solana exploits to the SOL-0XX rule class each one falls under —
Wormhole, Mango Markets, Cashio, Crema, Nirvana, Cypher, Loopscale, and more ($514M+ in documented
losses). Every entry is cited, and incidents no code rule can prevent (stolen keys, off-chain wallets)
are flagged as such rather than misattributed — the same honesty the rest of this repo holds itself to.
Browse the database →.
Every rule, explained — content/
content/ is a standalone explainer for all 37 rules: what each catches, the fix, whether
it is machine-checkable or review-only, the real exploits in that class (cross-linked to the Hacks
Database), and a code example where one exists. One page per rule — all generated from the standard +
patterns + hacks + examples, so nothing drifts.
Grow it — the disclosures/ feed
The standard is a living one. disclosures/ ingests a new Solana disclosure — a GitHub
Security Advisory, an Immunefi report, or a security-fix PR — and proposes a candidate Hacks-Database
entry with suggested SOL-0XX mappings for a human to verify. It never auto-writes (a cited DB only takes
reviewed entries). As an internal sanity check, the keyword classifier surfaces a labeled rule among its
ranked suggestions for every exploit already catalogued — self-consistency on our own root-cause text,
not a blind-accuracy or top-1 claim.
What you get
37 rules: 34 on-chain Solana program bug classes, plus 3 integrator / client-side rules (SOL-029–031) for the TypeScript/web3.js that builds and sends transactions (bots, keepers, integrators). SOL-001 covers two confirmed-exploitable bounty wins (the same caller-controlled now_slot class fixed in both the ACTIVATE and RETIRE branches of percolator). Most of the rest are drawn from documented Solana audit patterns — some from our published disclosures (with maintainer triage classifications noted in the Source column), some from public bug-class taxonomy; the integrator trio came from a live buyback-worker report.
| Rule | Catches | Source |
|---|---|---|
| SOL-001 | Unauthenticated now_slot / clock spoofing |
Bounty wins (2): percolator-prog#107 ACTIVATE + percolator-cli#78 F33 RETIRE |
| SOL-002 | Cross-market state asymmetry → counter inflation | Documented public class (percolator-prog#104) — not our bounty |
| SOL-003 | Wrapper handler re-implements engine logic | Pattern from our #78 F1 — maintainer fixed in-flight, not bountied |
| SOL-004 | Health/penalty terms omitted from calc | Pattern from our #78 F2 — engine-side, separate disclosure pending |
| SOL-005 | Anchor realloc() without guards |
Latent pattern from our #78 F12 — reachable when 14-asset cap lifted |
| SOL-006 | Missing signer check on privileged handler | Generic Solana |
| SOL-007 | Missing account.owner == program_id |
Generic Solana |
| SOL-008 | Unverified PDA derivation | Generic Solana |
| SOL-009 | CPI without authority check | Generic Solana |
| SOL-010 | Reinit attack via init_if_needed |
Generic Solana |
| SOL-011 | Lamport drain via account closure | Generic Solana |
| SOL-012 | Rent exemption check missing | Generic Solana |
| SOL-013 | Token Program ID confusion (Token vs Token-2022) | Generic Solana |
| SOL-014 | Unchecked integer arithmetic | Generic Solana |
| SOL-015 | Anchor has_one/constraint= missing |
Generic Anchor |
| SOL-016 | Bump seed not validated against canonical bump | Generic Solana |
| SOL-017 | Raw AccountInfo without typed deserialize |
Generic Solana |
| SOL-018 | Hardcoded System Program ID literal | Generic Solana |
| SOL-019 | Missing discriminator check on deserialize | Generic Solana |
| SOL-020 | SetAuthority without prior verification |
Generic Solana |
| SOL-021 | Terminal/close op gated on a live-only condition → funds lock | Jelleo v16 audit F1 — maintainer fixed as "Finding C" |
| SOL-022 | Write-only "impaired" counter never decremented → funds encumbered | Jelleo v16 audit F2 — percolator#74, code-confirmed |
| SOL-023 | Fee/penalty rounds toward the user → evasion + leakage | Jelleo v16 audit F3 (Low) |
| SOL-024 | Stale / unchecked Pyth/Switchboard oracle price | Generic Solana DeFi |
| SOL-025 | Sysvar read by raw deserialize (not Clock::get()) |
Generic Solana |
| SOL-026 | Duplicate mutable account unchecked (native + Anchor AccountLoader/remaining_accounts) |
Generic Solana |
| SOL-027 | Unvalidated remaining_accounts |
Generic Solana |
| SOL-028 | Missing slippage / min-out bound | Generic Solana DeFi |
| SOL-029 | Preflight simulation disabled (skipPreflight: true) on a mainnet send |
Integrator — live buyback-worker report (TS/web3.js) |
| SOL-030 | Hardcoded priority fee — no congestion awareness | Integrator — live buyback-worker report (TS/web3.js) |
| SOL-031 | Jupiter quote consumed without contextSlot freshness |
Integrator — live buyback-worker report (TS/web3.js) |
| SOL-032 | Decimals assumed (hardcoded scale) instead of read from the mint | Jelleo audit pattern — the decimals/accounting loss-of-funds class (review-only: a scale literal isn't machine-distinguishable) |
| SOL-033 | Account field read after a CPI without reload() — stale-state decisions |
Generic Anchor (documented reload footgun) |
| SOL-034 | Manual lamport mutation desyncs the program's internal ledger | Generic Solana |
| SOL-035 | Instructions sysvar read unpinned — forged introspection spoofs a precompile/CPI-origin check | Generic Solana (known precompile-bypass class) |
| SOL-036 | Token account trusted as an ATA without canonical (owner, mint) derivation | Generic Solana SPL (review-only) |
| SOL-037 | CPI callee program id unpinned — call redirected to an attacker program | Generic Solana (review-only; the callee-side gap SOL-009 doesn't cover) |
Why these rules — honest provenance
We disclose exactly where each rule came from. Some are confirmed-exploitable bounty wins; some are documented patterns we surfaced but the maintainer classified differently in triage. We list both kinds because all of them are real Solana attack surfaces worth flagging — but we don't claim bounty credit we didn't earn.
SOL-001 — TWO confirmed-exploitable bounty wins (same class, two code paths). ACTIVATE branch: percolator-prog#107, fixed in
6512fa1. RETIRE branch: percolator-cli#78 F33, fixed in3fd9b1d. Both maintainer-acknowledged via Lean theorem-prover models. Our suggestedauthenticated_slot_or_fallbackpatch shipped verbatim.SOL-002 — public class, not our bounty. The cross-market
pnl_pos_bound_totinflation class was publicly disclosed at percolator-prog#104 by another researcher. Included because the pattern is reproducible across perp-DEX programs.SOL-003, SOL-004, SOL-005 — patterns from our bounty 5 disclosure. All three were in our #78 submission (36 findings total). Maintainer triage outcomes: F1 already fixed in
0925ed4before triage; F2 engine-side (separate disclosure pending ataeyakovenko/percolator); F12 latent (reachable when the 14-asset cap is lifted). Real Solana patterns worth flagging in future code, none paid as new bounties.SOL-021, SOL-022, SOL-023 — patterns from our percolator v16 engine audit. F1 (terminal-close deadlock) was fixed by the maintainer as "Finding C". F2 (write-only impaired insurance counter) is disclosed at percolator#74 — code-confirmed, not yet reproduced on-chain. F3 (fee rounding) is Low. Code-analysis patterns, not claimed as paid bounties.
The remaining rules (SOL-006 through SOL-020, plus SOL-024 through SOL-028) cover documented Solana / DeFi audit patterns — signer/owner/PDA verification, Anchor constraints, CPI authority, lamport drains, Token Program ID confusion, integer overflow, oracle staleness, slippage bounds, etc. Standard auditor checklist territory.
All published cycle reports: jelleo.com/cycles
How it works
The standard is two source files — a YAML of deterministic patterns and a Markdown threat-model + rule catalog — plus a self-contained scanner. Every surface runs the same rules: the CLI, GitHub Action, editor extension, MCP server, and Semgrep apply them directly. In Claude Code specifically, Anthropic's security-guidance plugin reads the two files and reviews edits at three layers:
- On each file edit — fast pattern match (no model call). Reads
.claude/security-patterns.yamlfor regex/substring rules. Our file provides 23 deterministic patterns. - At the end of each turn — background model review of the full diff. Reads
.claude/claude-security-guidance.mdfor semantic guidance. Our file provides the Solana threat model + 37-rule catalog + review checklist. - On each commit Claude makes — deeper agentic review that reads surrounding code. Uses the same guidance file.
Every time a rule fires, the reminder text includes the rule ID (e.g. Jelleo SOL-001:) and a link back to this repo so you can see the underlying bounty case study.
Examples
The examples/ directory contains 23 paired vulnerable/fixed snippets — one for every machine-checkable rule (Rust on-chain; TypeScript for the integrator rules). They're self-tested: the scanner must fire on each vulnerable file and clear on each fixed one, so they can't drift from the rules. Useful for understanding a bug class before reading the rule definition.
Versioning
This repo follows Semantic Versioning. Pin a tagged release rather than main (the plugin-guidance.md digest ships from v1.11.0 onward — before that tag exists, use the Quick install from main):
curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Copenhagen0x/solana-security-standard/v1.11.0/plugin-guidance.md \
-o .claude/claude-security-guidance.md
A bare curl like this has no integrity check — for checksum + signed-tag verification use the Verified install flow above.
See CHANGELOG.md for the full version history.
Maintained by
Jelleo — continuous Solana program audits. Every cycle is Ed25519-signed and Merkle-rooted; all artifacts public at jelleo.com/cycles.
Each new bounty cycle we publish adds rules to this guidance. If you want a deeper audit of your Solana program, see jelleo.com.
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